

**COPY**

TOP SECRET

Copy No \_\_\_\_\_ of FIFTEEN  
Page No ONE of NINE

Headquarters  
Sultans Armed Forces  
Bail Al Falaj

PLANS/7

3rd March 1972

Col M G Harvey OBE, MC, ( Copy No 1)

Directive for Commander Dhofar, for 1972

References: A. My directive to you (PLANS/7) dated 12th of February 1971.  
B. My directive to you (PLANS/7) dated 9th September 1971.  
C. OPS/D/30 dated 20th of February 1972

#### INTRODUCTION

1. This Directive covers your responsibilities and tasks for 1972 up to and including the weeks immediately following the end of the monsoon. By that time the situation will have changed and our strategy in Dhofar will need to be reviewed. Also the new CSAF will wish to issue his own Directive.
2. This directive supplements References A and B and is effective wef date of receipt.

#### THE SITUATION

In the Sultanate as a whole.

3. The principal points which you should bear in mind since they influence the overall direction of the Sultanate's military effort, are:

- a. The internal security situation in the Sultanate at this time is generally satisfactory: more so than I had anticipated in September.
- b. I do not believe that this satisfactory situation will long continue; for the following reasons:
  - (1) The former Trucial States are visibly less stable than they were last year.
  - (2) The withdrawal of British forces from the Gulf will lead to a slow but steady increase in Soviet political and military influence in that area, and in consequence organised subversion.
  - (3) Any lessening of stability in the Gulf states, (whether or not it is caused by Soviet influence) will inevitably have repercussions on Oman.
  - (4) The Massadam Peninsula is of cardinal strategic importance. It can be expected to require an increasing proportion of the Sultanate's attention and resources.
  - (5) A number of factors, such as labour relations and the rapid rise in the cost of living, provide grounds in Oman for discontent and racial antagonism.
  - (6) We know that the two fronts (NDFLOAG and PFL0AG) have combined into a single front (The Popular Front for the Liberation of the Oman and the Arabian Gulf) and that the declared aims of the Front's leadership is to undermine the stability of the Sultanate through subversion and terrorism in central Oman .

2/..

TOP SECRET

**COPY**

TOP SECRET

Page No TWO of NINE

c. The role of Sultan Qaboos in the development of a stable Oman on is crucial. The protection of his Majesty against natural and terrorist hazards is of vital importance. Our enemies will strive to remove him.

d. The escalating civil and military budgets have already overstrained the country's limited resources. A reduction in the latter is necessary if development is to keep pace with the People's demands. An early end to the war in Dhofar is therefore essential. I believe that this is now attainable.

In Dhofar

4. The mission I gave you in February 1971 was "By the end of 1971 to have crippled the enemies capability of dominating the Jebel by military means" This aim has in general been achieved. I congratulate you. Your forces now dominate the eastern area; enemy resupply has, since the establishment of the LEOPARD line, been significantly reduced, and the enemy are now sensitive to the threats to their control of the Western area which your buildup at Mudhai, Habrut and Akoot pose. Rebel activities are now almost wholly defensive and appear to be directed towards survival and retaining PFLOAG's credibility in the eyes of the inhabitants and of their own foreign supporters.

5. However the war is not yet won. Although there is evidence that the enemy leadership is disturbed by the significant reverses that you have inflicted on the rebels during the past 12 months, there are also positive indications that the leadership is attempting to restore the situation.

6. These indications point to:

a. Greater enemy efforts to strengthen rebel forces in Dhofar by:

(1) Conscription of the young and their indoctrination at training centres in the Hauf area.

(2) Plans to break the blockade by new methods infiltration overland and by sea of supplies and reinforcements.

b. Increased political, financial and material support by the PDRY government for PFLOAG. It is likely that the PDRY government has already given the Front a significantly greater responsibility for the control of the 6th Governorate, and freedom of action there.

c. The use of more brutal methods to maintain PFLOAG's control over the inhabitants on both sides of the Frontier.

d. The introduction into Salalah, etc, of subversion and terrorism.

7. There is evidence however that the PDRY government has neither the wish nor the means to involve itself militarily in the war in Dhofar. It is more likely to do so in the event of aggression by Sultanate into PDRY territory: and then defensively.

AIMS

8. At this moment things are going increasingly in our favour. Our aim must now be to speed up the momentum of success and as early as possible to reach a situation in which PFLOAG activities in DHOFAR can be contained by smaller sultanate military forces than are now employed in this task.

Mission

9. To remove the rebel's capability of obstructing by force of arms Government activities in Dhofar.

3/..

TOP SECRET

**COPY**

TOP SECRET

Page No THREE of NINE

FUTURE OPERATIONS

Forces Available

10. S.A.F. Has now, except that NFR will come under your command in Dhofar in late April. At the end of June MR will relieve's DR (who return to Bid Bid) and's JR return to Nizwa.

11. Others.

a. I have recommended that the following elements of the British services remain in Dhofar to support you at least until the end of 1972 monsoon; and you can assume that these recommendations will be accepted:

- (1) The current elements of the Royal Artillery and Royal Air Force Regiment for the defence of RAF Salalah.
- (2) One Squadron of 22 SAS; their primary task being the support of Firqat operations in the Eastern area: this squadron to include an RMO.
- (3) A reduced intelligence cell.
- (4) A Psyops Team.
- (5) An RAVC Officer.
- (6) A BATT dispatch Team.
- (7) A Field Surgical Team.

b. I have also urged nothing be done to restrict SAF's use of RAF Air Transport Support for roulement between Dhofar and Oman, and for the carriage of urgently needed equipment from the United Kingdom.

c. It is possible that a small number of additional officers from the Royal Jordanian army will come on secondment to fulfil specialist appointments in SAF.

Tasks

12. The pattern of operations which you are to plan and conduct during 1972 should be designed to achieve:

- a. Increasingly firm control over the coastal plain, the coastal towns in the areas of Jebel and Negd we now hold.
- b. The continuance of pacification operations in the Eastern Area
- c. A major, permanent and decisive route blocking operation in the extreme West.
- d. Maintenance of the LEOPARD line blocks until c is fully achieved.

13. Operations to these ends are to continue throughout the monsoon.

14. Plains and Coastal Defence. This is fundamental. You well know its importance and it is fully covered in References A and B. I remind you however of :

- a. The need to guard against the threat of subversion, terrorism and sabotage.
- b. The need to retain for the external defence of RAF Salalah the forces shown in Reference B, Annex B, paragraph 1.

TOP SECRET

**COPY**

15. Pacification

- a. Pacification operations in the Eastern area are now going well. The conduct of those operations should, I suggest, remain the primary responsibility of the senior SAS officer in Dhofar. You should accede to his wishes when ever it is practicable to do so.
- b. The Firqats, supported by the SAS and BG, are now playing an increasingly aggressive and successful part in these operations. This welcome trend is to be encouraged: the more SAF combat units can be released for operations further West, the better
- c. I consider that pacification operations in the Eastern Area can be adjudged successful when:
  - (1) The coastal towns of Hasik, Sudh, Marbat, Taqa and Raysut are free from enemy harassment.
  - (2) The coastal track Taqa- Marbat is open for civilian traffic.
  - (3) The Wadi Darbat is cleared of enemy.
  - (4) Water is flowing down the falaj Ain Arzat - Mamura.
- d. Provided the enemy in the Central Area remains as inert as during the past months, you should not carry out offensive operations of short duration against them with SAF infantry. (Under the circumstances I envisage for the remainder of this year you are unlikely to have sufficient forces available to mount major pacification operations in that area).

16. Civil Action Government rehabilitation measures must go hand-in-hand with your military operations. I consider that the following are now of particular importance and you should press the Dhofar Provincial Civil Authorities to implement them:

- a. The retention of food controls whenever you have reason to believe that the enemy significantly benefit from supplies obtained by Jebali from the Government Controlled Area
- b. The establishment of canteens at which Jebali can eat and drink under supervision, as much as they wish and can pay for.
- c. The provision of elementary medical services at these canteens.
- d. The provision of pumped water for grazing.
- e. Veterinary services for Jebali who are in or visit the Controlled Areas.
- f. Accommodation, if only tented, for all who defect or flee from the enemy (This is likely to be a major problem as your forces close up to the West Frontier).

17. Coercion You should continue to employ penal measures already agreed by The Sultanate against those civilians who continue to give aid and comfort to the enemy. Those measures should, as far as possible, be applied by and on the initiative of the Firqats

Blocking of Enemy Supply Routes

18. LEOPARD Line. The establishment of the LEOPARD line has already significantly reduced and inhibited enemy resupply from the West to the Central and Eastern Areas. I would however make the following points about these block positions:

**COPY**

- a. They have no effect on the enemy's ability to reinforce the West with men and supplies brought in from PDRYY through to the north of Hauf.
- b. They are expensive in manpower to maintain.
- c. They will be more expensive, and difficult, to maintain during the monsoon.
- d. The ground is so broken that skillful enemy will increasingly find ways of slipping parties of men and camels round them.

Thus they will tend to become less rather than more effective.

19. Operations in the West.

- a. The enemy units in the West are still strong and virtually untouched by our previous activities. They must however be fragmented and destroyed at an early date.
- b. The enemy have recently dispersed their dumps of supplies and ammunition from the Shershatti and Baithandob areas. We have insufficient intelligence about the new locations of the latter on which to plan a major operation designed specifically to destroy the dumps. Operation LION is not therefore to be mounted.
- c. Your main operations are however to be mounted in the West in order to:
  - (1) Fragment and destroy the enemy units in the Western area
  - (2) Cut the PFLOAG rebel units in Dhofar off from their main bases in PDRY territory.
- d. The former will best be achieved by compelling the enemy to fight for ground vital to them under combat conditions favourable to us.
- e. The latter will be achieved by establishing permanent and rigorous blockades:
  - (1) On the narrow coastal strip which lies between the escarpment and sea in the extreme west of Dhofar (Operation SIMBA).
- and (2) On lesser routes which lead eastwards from PDRY frontier across the Jebel and Negd (Operation VULTURE).
- f. Your headquarters has already issued orders for operation VULTURE which begins on 9th March 1972
- G. My warning order to Operation SIMBA is that reference C.

20. Operation SIMBA

- a. This operation is to be commanded by Lt Col N.B. Knocker. He is responsible for drafting both the detailed operational plan and the detailed deception plan. He will submit both plans to you for approval.
- b. You are responsible for the coordination and control of the land, air and naval forces allotted to this operation, and for their logistic support.
- c. The deception plan is of major importance. An integral part of the deception plan are:
  - (1) Concept of Operation LION.
  - (2) Strict control of all reconnaissance of the SIMBA areas.
  - (3) Psyops activities.



- d. L - Day is to be:
  - (1) Not before 7th April.
  - (2) Not later than 22nd of April

You are to select the date in consultation with CO DR

- e. Akoot is to be given up after DR group are firmly established on simba positions.
- f. The maximum use is to be made of natural and artificial obstacles to form a permanent barrier-line. This barrier line must be kept under surveillance by patrols, defended locations and observed fire.
- g. The LEOPARD line blocks are to be maintained until the VULTURE and SIMBA lines are fully effective.

Restrictions on Operations Near the Frontier

21. Though Sultanate relations with PDRY are far from normal, we are NOT in a state of war. It is the firm policy of the Sultanate Government that no action is to be taken by Sultanate forces which would result in the latter being named on any account as an aggressor. You are therefore to maintain a very strict control over all your forces, regular or irregular, which operate, overtly or covertly, near the Frontier between PDRY and Sultan.

22. At Annex A are listed for your compliance and guidance certain contingencies which might arise, and the actions which your forces are or are not to take.

23. You will note that the constraints imposed on your operation in February 1971 (Reference A, paragraph 3 refers) still apply.

24. As regards the points mentioned in Reference C, paragraph 10:

- a. You must assume, until more definite instructions are received by you, that the PDRY Frontier in the SIMBA area runs from GR YU 205404 to GR YU 140500.
- b. Your forces are not, unless specific orders are issued by the Sultanate government to the contrary, to operate within a belt 5 Kilometers wide to the east of the line defined in sub-paragraph 24 above.

FORCE ORGANISATION

DG/BG

25. In order to make these two units more efficient and cost-effective I wish you to submit to the Defence Secretary at an early date proposals for the merger of the DG and BG:

- a. Initially at command level.
- b. Subsequently into a combined unit to be permanently stationed in Dhofar.

The Firqats

26. Command and support of the Firqats is, with the exception of FTZ, FHG and Mob currently a BATT responsibility. It is working, despite of many frustrations, increasingly well.

27. Owing to the rundown and eventual disappearance of BATT, SAF is obliged from now on to assume greater responsibility for this.

7/...





28. A small Control Cell has been established to undertake these tasks. Owing to financial manning difficulties this Cell will not be large enough to command, administer and lead every individual Firqat in the field.

29. You should therefore arrange for:

- a. The Cell to assume responsibility now for the administration of all Firqats.
- b. Command and Control of certain Firqats to be assumed by the SAF unit in whose area of responsibility they operate (eg FTZ, FAN and Mob).
- c. BATT to retain responsibility for the command control the Firqats in the Eastern area.
- d. FAB to come under the SAF Cell
- c. FHG to remain under SIO Negd.

30. It is necessary also to:

- a. Select now and sent the training members of the Firqats who appear fitted for employment in civilian supervisory or specialist appointments. This will not only help the civil administration, it will also demonstrate the Firqat members that they have an important long-term role to play in the development of their homeland.
- b. Remove from the payroll and disarm those Firqat members who are consistently untrustworthy or ineffective. This measure will help to make the Firqat Force more cost-effective. It cannot however be implemented without the agreement of the Firqat leader or the Wali Dhofar.

J D G Graham  
Brigadier  
Commander

Annex A: Frontier Contingencies and Related Orders.

Distribution

Personal and for Information only to :

Copy No

Lieutenant Colonel W W Kerr	2
Lieutenant Colonel J B Ray, MBE	3
Lieutenant Colonel N B Knocker	4
Lieutenant Colonel P Worthy	5
Lieutenant Colonel P E de la C de la Billiere, MC	6
Wing Commander P J Hirst, RAF	7
Commander D R Williams, MBE	8
Major H E P Colley, RA	9
Squadron Leader P S Hulme	10
Colonel H R D Oldman, OBE, MC	11
Brigadier J D C Graham, OBE	12 & 13
HQ SAF File	14
HQ Dhofar (for Colonel M H H Collins, MBE)	15

a/...



FRONTIER CONTINGENCIES AND RELATED ORDERS

Contingency 1

- a. General Orders. Applicable since 12th February 1971, the following orders apply:

"Under no circumstances is Commander Dhofar to permit ground, air or naval forces, or projectiles fired therefore, to operate or fall beyond the limits as follows:

a. East and South The limits of the Sultanate territorial waters, i.e. a line running 12 miles offshore.

b. On the West Sultanate frontier with PDRY and Saudi Arabia.

b. Consideration. Though Sultanate relations with PDRY are far from normal, we are not in a state of open war, and it is not in the best interests of our country to be named on any account as a technical aggressor. Politically the Sultanate now has a greatly strengthened position within the Arab world. Most Arab States despise the Maoist government in PDRY, and have active sympathy for the efforts by the Sultanate to bring peace and prosperity to Dhofar. PDRY have not so far been caught out in any attributable action against the Sultanate. SAF have quite enough to do to finish off the PFLOAG threat inside our own borders.

- c. Direction The regulation expressed contingency 1a is confirmed

Contingency 2

a. Hostile fire is opened against Sultanate forces operating on Sultanate territory or in Sultanate territorial waters by weapons sited in PDRY territory. For example an artillery piece in Hauf fires into the Sultanate.

b. Consideration. Such action would constitute a technical aggression against the Sultanate. It would undoubtedly be difficult to prove the offence conclusively.

c. Direction SAF is to ignore isolated instances of such fire. In the event that it becomes clear that PDRY is prepared to continue their aggression to the point where their fire really matter to SAF, CSAF is to ask for specific permission through Defence Secretary to HM The Sultan to "take out" the gun or guns by air action. Maximum notice is to be given.

Contingency 3

a. PDRY uniformed personnel clearly identified as such are seen to be operating in a hostile manner on Sultanate territory.

b. Direction. SAF have every legal right to engage such personnel, and kill them.

Contingency 4

a. Aircraft of PDRY a force are identified over the Sultanate territory.

b. Direction. Whether acting in a hostile manner or not SOAF have every legal right to engage in destroy such aircraft.

Contingency 5

a. Firqat, through indiscipline, carry out private operations across the PDRY frontier without the knowledge of SAF, and in disobedience of the current standing orders as expressed in Contingency 1. It is conceivable for instance that members of the Western Mahra Firqat might disappear in uniform and armed, into PDRY, say to bring out some friends.

9/...

TOP SECRET

COPY



- b. Consideration. Such an operation be attributable the Sultanate, would constitute a technical aggression, and should not be allowed to happen.
- c. Direction
- (1) If it does happen, despite clear orders by SAF the Firqat leader and those responsible for the foray are to be disciplined through Wali Dhofar and to suffer a two-month stoppage of special Firqat pay.
- (2) In the event that such disobedience takes place, and the Firqat get into trouble on PDRY territory SAF may not mount any rescue operation involving violation of PDRY sovereign territory. This to include fire by SAF weapons on Sultanate territory into PDRY. Firqats are to be clearly warned of this.

Contingency 6

- a. Once SAF land forces have closed up to the's PDRY frontier it is conceivable that inviting opportunities may present themselves, requiring a limited operation across PDRY frontier, to carry out a specific military task and return.
- b. Direction
- (1) The circumstances in which such an operation could be viable and desirable, are to be considered on a case-by-case basis. Commander Dhofar and CSAF should be able to perceive the need well in advance of the requirement for such an operation. This application should be made through the Defence Secretary for HM The Sultan's permission for planning to take place.
- (2) Is permitted such an operation should not be attributable to the Sultanate i.e.:
- (a) It is to take place in civilian dress.
- (b) Weapons are to be from captured enemy stocks.
- (c) Only Dhofaris or South Yemenis are to be used in any such operation.

