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SECTION 5

THE ENEMY

General

1. PFLOAG (The Popular Front for the Liberation of the Oman and Arabian Gulf) is controlled, trained and administered with Chinese backing. However, despite occasional rumours there is no evidence that any Chinese has ever crossed the border.
2. The organisation shown is a general one. It changes from time to time as units are switched from one area to another to rest, retrain or meet operational emergencies.
3. The enemy operate under the normal Communist Committee system with the following structure:
 - a. Central Committee responsible for overall policy.
 - b. Military Committee responsible for the military aspects of the revolution.
 - c. Economic Committee.
 - d. Administrative Committee.

Basic Organisation and tasks

4. PFLOAG consists of the following military units:
 - a. Western Approaches The Western Military Unit of three Firqats each of about 50 hardcore responsible for protecting the hardcore area where supply dumps, training camps etc are.
 - b. HO CHI MINH Routes HO CHI MINH Unit about 70 strong responsible for escorting camel convoys through to the Centre and East.
 - c. Central Area Central unit of two Firqats each of about 70 hardcore. Northern sub-unit responsible for Northern Approaches to Jabel including Midway Road. Southern sub-unit responsible for Southern Approaches including Midway Road and also for posing threats to R&F Salalah and Raysut.
 - d. Eastern Area Scattered elements of two to three Firqats. Tasks when not being chased by SAF, are to threaten coastal towns of TAQA and MARBAT.
5. Each Firqat can call on Militia who may double its strength. In some cases they are permanently called out, eg in the eastern Area at the moment. In others they are called on when need be.

Equipment

6. Generally speaking hardcore are equipped with SKS and AK 47 rifles. Militia usually carry number 4 rifles but some have communist weapons. An average Firqat will have in its area:
 - a1 One 75mm RCL (range 7,000 metres).
 - b. One medium mortar (3", 81 or 82mm, range of 82mm mortar about 3,400 metres).
 - c. some MMGs, 60mm mortars and a number of LMGs. Some HMGs have AA capability.
7. In areas which the enemy consider important, extra RCLs and heavy MGs may be mounted eg Midway Road, Rakhyut, facing Akoot.

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8. The enemy have a limited number of Walkie Talkie radios for tactical control and a rather shaky command net from HAUF to all units. In many cases messages have to be relayed. Important messages are sent by courier.

Training

9. Varies enormously. Many hardcore have been trained in China and North Korea and some of the men who defect have had such training. The programme for a PFLOAG Course in Peking is shown at Annex A. At Annex B is shown a typical day in the life of an Adoo on the Jebel.

9A. Some have deserted from the TOS. One reports that training in China is not as good as TOS training. Nevertheless certain aspects are good:

- a. Small arms shooting very good.
- b. Fieldcraft and use of ground.
- c. Some well trained in use of mines and booby traps though some have been blown up by our booby traps and their own mines.
- d. Coordination not good at a higher level, relying very much on couriers. Coordinated shellings etc do take place but usually on the clock hour.

10. RCL and mortar firing is erratic. Sometimes very bad it has improved in the case of some crews who can produce very accurate fire. These seem however to be few and far between.

Morale

11. Also varies enormously. Many hardcore are brave, skillful and determined. However they are cruel and impose their will on the weaker members ruthlessly and many people who argued have been executed. The large number of defectors is the biggest SAF success. Only fear of execution keeps many people from joining the government side. Reasons for defection differ but they include:

- a. Disagreement with communist anti-Islamic methods.
- b. News that the defector was due for execution anyway, ie. Punk.
- c. Lack of food.

Minor Tactics

12. Although in theory the enemy are indoctrinated in Maoist tactical thought they have not all read their little red book properly. As a result they do tend to be creatures of habit, using the same fire positions or routes until prevented.

13. Generally speaking the enemy do not like operating outside the treeline ie the line of scrub formed by the monsoon on the North and South slopes of the Jebel.

14. The enemy try hard to distract SAF from offensive operations by taking on targets like RAF Salalah, Raysut and the coastal towns at long range.

15. Similarly like all Arabs they like their battles to be stand off shoots at long range. Their idea of an attack is coordinated mortar and RCL fire on a location. There have been some instances of the enemy in early 1971 closing to a close fight but in the main they have learnt the dangers of this. Enemy units which have closed have usually done so by skilful peppercotting. In two isolated recent instances, enemy troops skirmished forward and fired from short range before withdrawing again. It is thought that these two instances were both the same unit.

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16. Likewise it is the exception rather than the rule for the enemy to fight at night. They only do so if protecting something they don't want to lose. Although they sometimes fire at night they prefer last light to get the best shot plus a chance to escape without aircraft retaliating.
17. They use the dark to lay anti-tank mines on roads and also make good use of anti-personnel mines in old dugouts, airstrips etc and areas they know will be used.
18. They do not hesitate to use women to give early warning of S.F. approach and indeed some women fight in the Mobile Force.
19. Standard tactics on unexpected S.F. approach are:
- Wailing from Women.
 - Single shots as warning.
 - Local Militia turns out to harass and try to establish S.F. locations.
 - If S.F. unit sits still long enough 60 to 80 men will arrive with heavy weapons.
20. The enemy like to be able to mortar and machine gun fixed S.F. locations from long range. Units who keep on the move worry them.
21. The enemy are confused by helicopter use, never being sure what troops have got in or out, what their strengths etc are.
22. The enemy do not like jet strikes. The enemy unit anti-aircraft drills are good. They lie low as aircraft run in. After the aircraft has fired and is pulling out of its dive all enemy within range open up with every weapon that can.
23. They sometimes use searching fire on hillsides to get S.F. to show their locations by returning fire.
24. Their use of snipers is good and the first rounds of an engagement may only be to attract attention and get heads up for a sniper in another location to get a good shot in.
25. The enemy like to harass withdrawing troops and follow up very quickly. Good communications, leapfrogging and preplanned supporting fire are essential in these conditions.
26. The one or two S.F. ambushes and enemy ambushes which have resulted in close contact have shown the enemy in poor light.
- Example one. A S.F. platoon caught in an enemy ambush charged the ambush and routed it.
 - Example Two. A S.F. ambush shot up three separate groups before the enemy reacted.
- However the enemy ambush in depth using LMG and MGs further back on higher ground to add weight to the ambush is effective.
27. The enemy make skilful use of RCLs and are not in the least hindered by having to manhandle them. They are usually fired from behind a crest with aiming marks on the crest to assist. The gun is brought into action quickly, one ranging round fired followed by perhaps three for effect. The gun is then taken out of action. The whole action may only take 90 seconds. Both RCLs and mortars are kept hidden and their locations are only known by trusted crew members themselves. When in action heavy weapons invariably have a screen of infantry pikets to cover their withdrawal. RCLs and mortars are moved rapidly back to their caches by manpack or sometimes donkey.

Administration

28. Ascertain amount of food, eg meat and milk, is obtained on the Jebel. More undoubtedly gets through the food control system from the coastal towns. However a great deal has to come in by camel convoy. The Jebali does not like too much meat since it is too strong for his stomach. If denied things like tea, rice, sugar etc he suffers.

29. There is always enough water in the Jebel for small parties of men and camels. Therefore the enemy has few supply problems except where S.F are sitting on his waterholes.

30. Enemy supplies of arms, ammunition, medical stores and food are normally by ship to Hauf and by camel convoy thereafter. Convoys are escorted through by the HO CHI MINH unit using a screen and picquets. The camel routes are known but there are numerous varieties of the main routes so 100 per cent ambush of them is not possible. Nevertheless they follow three clear main routes. These routes have to vary during the monsoon as the rain makes some of them too slippery for camels. The enemy therefore, like S.F, have to build up stocks immediately before and after the monsoon. In future the enemy are likely to make greater use of the trans-Nagd routes.

31. Stocks are held in dumps in the Western Approaches, and also in the Central Area.

32. Casualties are evacuated down the camel routes to Hauf. When essevac is not feasible casualties are held locally in caves. Unless severely pressed the enemy, like all Arabs, gets his dead and wounded out of action very efficiently.

Casualty Figures

33. From 1 January 1971 to 1 March 1972 the enemy lost:

a. SEP to S.F	420
b. PW	5
c. Confirmed dead	165
d. Reported dead	302
e. Reported wounded	231

34. In the same period S.F lost:

- Two enemy SEP who redefected (however one came back to us yet again).
- KIA 46 (including 10 in battle accidents).
- WIA 56

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Annex A to Section 5

COURSE PROGRAMME - PFLOAG COURSE
ANTI-IMPERIALIST SCHOOL, PEKING

1. The course is of 6 months duration. It alternates between one months Political Instruction, the next Military Instruction.

2. Course Routine

- a. 0600 Reveille and 15 minutes PT.
- b. 0700 Breakfast.
- c. 0730 - 1200 Two lessons with 10 minute break between them.
- d. 1200 Lunch followed by Volley Ball and Table Tennis.
- e. 1400 - 1800 Two lessons with 10 minute break between them.
- f. 1800 Dinner.
- g. 1930 - 2100 Discussion period of subjects studied during the day with Tutor.

3. Political Course Subjects

- a. General lines of Chinese Revolution. Extracts were made when applicable to Dhofar.
- b. Cutting lines of communication and isolating towns and communications from one another.
- c. Founding and building a Revolutionary Party.
- d. Founding and building a Communist Party in the country concerned.
- e. Founding and building a Peoples Revolutionary Army.
- f. Organising the people into Militia Groups.

All teachings and instruction were based on MACISM with some MARXIST-LENINISM.

4. Military Course The course started with lessons in the school based on MACs Seven Military Sayings. (1. Arouse and Organise the People. 2. Achieve internal unification politically. 3. Establish bases. 4. Equip bases. 5. Recover material strength. 6. Destroy enemy national strength. 7. Regain lost territories.). This was followed by an initial three day training exercise in an area 2 - 3 miles North of the School. No night training was undertaken. Subjects were:

- a. Use of Recce patrols.
- b. Isolation of units.
- c. Basic radio instruction.
- d. Basic mining and explosives work.
- e. Leadership.
- f. Engagement of aircraft with SA.

5. Weapons Instruction was on:
- a. DSHK (12.7 HMG).
 - b. 75mm RCL.
 - c. 82mm mortar.
 - d. 60mm mortar.
 - e. GORYUNOV 7.62 MMG
 - f. RPG 2 (shoulder controlled Anti-Tank weapon).
 - g. F 1 Grenade.
6. All students learnt the theory of mine detection and neutralisation but taught entirely on Chinese mines.
7. The instruction given on weapons had its emphasis on how they should be controlled and used rather than on actual operation.

A TYPICAL DAY IN THE LIFE OF AN "ADOO"

1. Daytime

- a. Dawn. Stand to.
- b. 0800 Tea (if available).
- c. 1200 Lunch. Meat or rice, ghee, tea (if available) (Note: rice and ghee are almost non-existent).
- d. 1600 Short patrol out to clear area.
- e. 1800 Stand to, then tea (no sugar available).

Note: Although no particular time of day is allotted for political discussion units not in contact or in sensitive areas will have Maoist indoctrination periods during their working day.

2. Night.

- a. On Patrol Patrols move normally in 2 x 6 man groups in single file with a gap between the two groups.
- b. In Base When not on watch patrols split into threes and individuals sleep up to 20 yards apart. Sentries are normally posted.