FRONT

RECOMMENDATIONS FOR HONOURS OR AWARDS

INSTRUCTIONS

DO NOT WRITE IN THIS MARGIN

1. To be completed in accordance with current instructions and forwarded to Ministry of Defence (MS3), Stanmore, Middlesex.

NOT to be used in connection with campaign stars or medals.

No abbreviations, except those officially authorized, will be used.

Whenever possible, typescript should be used.

This recommendation will NOT be considered unless the personal particulars of the individual are correctly completed

If a casualty complete below:		
Killed in action on		(For Ministry of Defence use only) Citation No.
Died of wounds on	***************************************	File(s)
Missing on	***********	L.G. No. and date
Prisoner of War on		Previous awards
Christian or Fore Name(s)	Surname	Delete as appropriate Regular/T&AVR
HICHARL JUH ANTHONY	REALT	Kegular, Harries
Personal/Army number 479272	Sub. Rank CAPPATH	Present rank (if different from Sub. Rank)
Unit		Parent Regiment or Corps
22 SPECIAL AIR SERVICE REGISERT		CHEENS DIVISION
Honour or Award for which recommended DS0		Award for which finally approved by Ministry of Defen
		(For Ministry or Defence use only)
		DEO
Date (6 AUGUST, 1972 Remarks of Brigade (or equivalent) An outstanding example	Commander of bravery and	ure ALL LOSS (Line Remarks of Divisional (or equivalent) Commander
Date MURICIA 1972 Remarks of Brigade (or equivalent) An outstanding example leadership well worthy Very strongly recommend	Commander of bravery and of recognition.	ure fell loebilline
Date MURICIA 1972 Remarks of Brigade (or equivalent) An outstanding example leadership well worthy Very strongly recommend	Commander of bravery and of recognition.	ure fill lows Windle and Divisional (or equivalent) Commander
Date	Commander of bravery and of recognition.	nre fell loebelland AIR SERVICE REVIEWENT Remarks of Divisional (or equivalent) Commander Signature
LT-COL P.E. do la C. do	Commander of bravery and of recognition. ed. ELSEA. Commander	nre All Lows Williams Remarks of Divisional (or equivalent) Commander Date Place
Date	Commander of bravery and of recognition. ed. ELSEA Commander	Remarks of Divisional (or equivalent) Commander Date Place Remarks of Army (or equivalent) Commander
Date	Commander of bravery and of recognition. ed. ELSEA Commander or other Recommending	Remarks of Divisional (or equivalent) Commander Date Place Signature Date Place Date Place
Date MUNICIPAL 1972 Remarks of Brigade (or equivalent) An outstanding example leadership well worthy Very strongly recommends Signature N Remarks of Corps (or equivalent) Signature Place CHO Remarks of Commander-in-Chief	Commander of bravery and of recognition. ed. Commander Or other Recommending VERY STROM P. EUGENPER	Remarks of Divisional (or equivalent) Commander Date Place Signature Date Place Date Place

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DO NOT WRITE IN THIS

MARGIN

CITATION

(To be completed by Initiating Officer)

- A. Recommended in respect of:-
 - (i) New Year 19.....
 - (ii) Birthday 19.....
 - (iii) Immediate Award (operational)
 - (iv) Operational Award (other than immediate)
 - (v) Non-operational Gallantry Award
 - (vi) Meritorious Service Medal

Delete all descriptions not applicable.

- B. Action or service for which commended:-
 - (i) Place DEODAL SULTANIA OF OUR
 - *(ii) Date of action or period covered by the citation19. THEY.1972......

 - (iv) Other detail:-

SEE ATTACHED SHEET

V81) Dd.805598, IBM. 9/70, K.C.N. Gp.616/1.

^{*} The period covered by the citation must be completed as accurately as possible.


Bast of SALALAN. It is wired in and has a mall military paraison of local gondarmeric and ASLARA, the lutter being equivalent to have ward. The defence of the town is the responsibility of the SAR contingent and full responsibility for its control lies with the SAR contingent and full responsibility for its control lies with the SAR contingent.

There has been no major attack on the term of LIBBAT since operations commenced in PROFAL some two years ago until the night of the 19th July. On this night the communist insurgants decided to bount, against MIRRAY, the largest most determined and best pleased without that they have launc ed in the whole compaign. From captured enemy personnel it has since become clear that they were confident of their success and that had they captured the town they intended to occupy it permanently and establish a seat of communist government in DEOFAR. The political implications of such a dramatic turn of events need no further expansion.

At 0530 hours on the morning of the 19th July mortars started to rain in on the MIRBAT Garrison. The Garrison was stood to and under Captain KMALY's direction commenced the battle for the town. For over 4 hours the communists pressed home their attack; they infiltrated the town; they destroyed the stone defences with RCL, Rocket Launcher and Mortar fire; they concentrated a major effort against the SAS personnel in the town; they closed to granade range and fought with a ferocity, tenacity and blind dedication that is the mark of all Communist shock troops. They launched this attack with an estimated 250 men against a small garrison town whose defence was designed to repel attacks from no more than a dozen men acting without determination. It was only after 4 hours of continual and ferocious fighting that they finally admitted defeat and withdrew leaving behind some 40 wounded and killed. A subsequent radio intercept indicates that they suffered at least 86 casualties and subsequent intelligence reports indicate that this figure may be as high as 100 or more.

Captain KEALY was the officer in charge of SAS Troops in MIRBAT and as such held full responsibility for all aspects of the defence of the town. When the battle commenced he immediately deployed his 9-man team to the 2 strategic buildings in the town, one of which was alongside the 25 Par gun position. So stretched were defences that the 25 pdr gun was manned by SAS soldiers in the absence of any trained crew. As the battle developed it became clear to KEALY that the gun position alongside the Dhofar fort was under considerable pressure. He decided to place himself in this location where he could best direct the most intensive fighting and where his personal leadership would make the most outstanding impression on the Arab troops under his command. On his way across to the gun he came under heavy fire from small arms and mortars and had to complete the final 250 metres under these conditions. On arrival in the position he found one of the crew had been killed and the other one was wounded. Together with a medical orderly, who had accompanied him, he treated the wounded man who continued to fight, and then became involved personally in the hand to hand fighting that was taking place.

Not long after this the only other unwounded British soldier (the medical orderly) was also severely wounded leaving MEALY on his own to repel the enemy and to command the overall defence of the town. For a further hour there were repeated attempts by the enemy to take the fort held by MEALY and a handful of Arab soldiers. Two appeared by the right wall and were fired on by Captain




KEALY. A fierce and bitter skirmish developed during which the enemy threw grenades at MEALY and the remaining living defenders. MEALY shot and personally killed several of the enemy during this exchange.


Due to his inspired leadership the local ASKARS, who had a reputation for being inadequate soldiers, fought with a confidence and determination that has never been seen in previous actions. When the main fighting was over and the town had been relieved by a reinforcement force REALY personally conducted the evacuation of the wounded, the realignment and reconstitution of the defences and with tremendous seal and energy generally rebuilt the shattered morale of the town.

On hearing that a Firqa patrol of his was still in the field he personally led a small patrol to contact them despite the threat from a considerable number of marauding gangs of enemy milling round the countryside. He found several of the Firqa and an ASKAR picquet had been killed and that the main Firqa force was in a position in which he was unable to offer them positive assistance. However, his determination and bravery in leading this subsequent patrol contributed greatly to the esteem and respect with which the Firqa subsequently held the British troops.

There is no doubt that had MIRBAT fallen it would have been a major defeat to Western interests in the Middle Bast and could well have been the cause of a major political reappraisal of this country's attitude to its position in the Middle East. Thanks to MEALY's spirited fortitude, his determined leadership, his dauntless bravery and his outstanding conduct of a battle against tremendous odds, this crisis has not only been avoided but the threatening enemy have been defeated on a scale unparalleled in the history of Muscat.

ANTIEX A - NIRHAR PLAN





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