

have not seen is undoubtably available both in UK and Oman. The source lists show that in producing this summary I have consulted only a very limited range of readily available documents.

3. The seriousness of the threat in Dhofar emerged only gradually. Perhaps it was truly not very great to begin with although the rebels were getting outside aid very early on. The main preoccupation in UK and the Sultanate was the threat in Northern Oman (where incidents were still occurring) aggravated by ORM propaganda and the UN debates on Oman.

4. Perhaps the main (if academic) question arising out of this period is whether the rebellion could have been nipped in the bud. Factors are:

The character of the Sultan and his advisers. a.

The extent of external support given to the rebels b. from the outset.

c. The attitude of neighbouring states.

d. The effectiveness of the Dhofar force and the Omani askers.

e. The limitations on UK's freedom of action.

f. The quality of intelligence available.

The size of SAF in relation to its new commitment. g.

h. SAF's need to gain local knowledge.

